Judgments of the trial court and court of appeals reversed and cause is remanded for trial. Actually the plaintiff was obliged to undergo three operations, and her appearance was worsened. P never received the document nor inquired as to why it was not received. . Therefore it is unlikely that physicians of even average integrity will in fact make such promises. Judicial skepticism about whether a promise was in fact made derives also from the possibility that the truth has been tortured to give the plaintiff the advantage of the longer period of limitations sometimes available for actions on contract as distinguished from those in tort or for malpractice.
The testimony so lacks precision that it is impossible to determine the precise nature of the conversations. These causes of action are, however, considered a little suspect, and thus we find courts straining sometimes to read the pleadings as sounding only in tort for negligence, and not in contract for breach of promise, despite sedulous efforts by the pleaders to pursue the latter theory. It does not follow that P would have realized a return of 500K if it had been allowed to fully perform. P filed suit against D claiming that D had breached the agreement to sell the building to P and that P was entitled to recover the funds and services expended on the building under a statutory or equitable lien theory. The second count, based on the same transaction, was in the conventional form for malpractice, charging that the defendant had been guilty of negligence in performing the surgery. D was informed that satisfactory leases had been obtained and that P had offered to pay balance of the purchase price. These were never worked out and building was sold to a third party at which time P ceased to manage it.
D further contended that the oral promise of job security was in no way binding. D, on receipt of a holdup alarm, was to promptly transmit the alarm to the police department. Further, the agreement states the P owns a business adapted to the placing of such endorsements as D has approved. White testified that the lack of water in the bathroom on one occasion caused an odor and that on two other occasions she was forced to take her children to a neighbor's home to bathe them. White testified that the lack of water in the bathroom on one occasion caused an odor and that on two other occasions she was forced to take her children to a neighbor's home to bathe them. By his exceptions the defendant contends that the judge erred in allowing the jury to take into account anything but the plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses presumably at the stipulated amount. The court, following the usual expectancy formula, would have asked the jury to estimate and award to the plaintiff the difference between the value of a good or perfect hand, as promised, and the value of the hand after the operation.
She did not and the offer lapsed. The contract price does not limit recovery. Written agreement was evidenced on a deposit receipt. P stated that he did not think this would be necessary. She had a meeting with the director and left the meeting very unsatisfied. D employed P to help turn this Vogue into money. See Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 Wash.
Since prospective employment might have been terminated at any time, the measure of damages is not so much what he would have earned from D, but what he lost in quitting the job he held and declining at least one other offer of employment elsewhere. Brewster 13 involved the breach of an employment contract. The same formula Page 584 would apply, although the dollar result would be less, if the operation had neither worsened nor improved the condition of the hand. If a contract was made, there was in the nature of the case sufficient consideration to sustain the promise. There is no bargained for exchange. See also annotation, 27 A.
P put D in touch with Carley and arranged a meeting. P brought suit to recover compensation for the room and board furnished to the decedent. Second contact was to remove old roof entirely and build a new roof. The district court denied the claim as speculative. Although persons may attend only to draw the free car, they might nonetheless be induced to bid on a car once they arrive. Proof of such items should be made subject to the usual rules of evidence. Some of the invoices they submitted were paid and some were not.
He also testified that a market survey in the area before the drive-in was built showed a need for a theatre in that area. Where the doctor has been absolved of negligence, an expectancy measure may be overly harsh. D appeals a jury verdict in favor P. When the lease period ended, the land was not reclaimed. Suffering or distress resulting from the breach going beyond that which was envisaged by the treatment as agreed, should be compensable on the same ground as the worsening of the patient's conditions because of the breach.
An expectancy recovery may be excessive, given that the cause of action may be somewhat suspect. Defendants are liable to P for reasonable cost of doing what they have promised to do. No actual injury could be shown by the mere fact that the landlord entered the tenant's apartment, therefore damages were nominal and no punitory award could be made. Consideration requires that a contractual promise be the product of a bargain. This question requires factual determinations which are improper on a motion for summary judgment.
If they are a growing firm, it is likely that they would be recovered. There is no question the P conferred a benefit upon D. The Whites were periodically inconvenienced when the Benkowskis temporarily turned off the water to alert the Whites they were using too much water. The declaration was in two counts. Mold-Tech and its agent, Keystone Rolls, Inc. These circumstances defeated both his implied-in-fact and his quasi-contract claim. Nor will a health danger which was foreseeable when the contract was entered into justify its breach.
There was no attempt to define profits, nor any instruction given as to how these profits were to be estimated. D filed a motion to dismiss demurrer on the ground that punitive damages cannot be awarded for breach of contract. It may be noted that on an alternative count for malpractice the plaintiff in the Hawkins case had been nonsuited; but on ordinary principles this could not affect the contract claim, for it is hardly a defence to a breach of contract that the promisor acted innocently and without negligence. No Wisconsin case in which breach of K other than breach of a promise to marry has led to the award of punitive damages. True, if the buyer under a contract for the purchase of a lot of merchandise, in suing for the seller's breach, should claim damages for mental anguish caused by his disappointment in the transaction, he would not succeed; he would be told, perhaps, that the asserted psychological injury was not fairly foreseeable by the defendant as a probable consequence of the breach of such a business contract. D filed a demurrer which was sustained. The plaintiffs are not required to ascertain their damages with mathematical precision, but rather the trier of fact must set damages a reasonable amount.