And this is a different thing than an arrest for the purpose of taking them to the station house and booking them for a crime. Likewise, if you have case briefs you would like to share, please send them to. When the men merely mumbled answers in response to his inquiries, the officer grabbed Terry defendant , spun him around, and patted down his outer clothing to determine whether Terry was armed. On the motion to suppress the guns, the prosecution took the position that they had been seized following a search incident to a lawful arrest. This process normally involves the stopping of a person or vehicle with the purpose of interrogation or a brief investigation… Download file to see previous pages Ohio, 392 U. The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion.
Detective McFadden was unable to remove the pistol and ordered all three men in the store, to stand against a wall with their hands up. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded. When he did, he had no reason whatever to suppose that Terry might be armed, apart from the fact that he suspected him of planning a violent crime. However, given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. United States, , 367-368 1964 ; Agnello v. In the left breast pocket of Terry's overcoat, Officer McFadden felt a pistol.
The frisk, it held, was essential to the proper performance of the officer's investigatory duties, for without it 'the answer to the police officer may be a bullet, and a loaded pistol discovered during the frisk is admissible. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. See Johnson, however, argues that the exception cited by Arizona does not apply to his case because certain key elements are lacking. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to canvass in detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of a policeman's power when he confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him.
Officer McFadden seized Chilton's gun, asked the proprietor of the store to call a police wagon, and took all three men to the station, where Chilton and Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons. In this case, the Supreme Court may determine the weight of concern for officer safety against the weight of requirements traditionally needed for searches of individuals. Terry and Chilton were arrested, indicted, tried and convicted together. We think, therefore, that if this is to prevail, that it is for the State to be able to persuade this Court that this Court has somewhere in history permitted something other than probable cause to determine whether an arrest and a search and seizure is probable, or one that is impermissible. Lastly, we would ask you to consider, in accordance with decisions such as DeRay, where this Court has said a search is either good or bad when it starts, and it does not change character thereafter; and, that the after-the-event justification does not relate back to justify the original, initial unlawful search.
The officer may also conduct a search if upon the. However, given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. And, by suggesting a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation under the Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional regulation. Just as a full search incident to a lawful arrest requires no additional justification, a limited frisk incident to a lawful stop must often be rapid and routine. The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argument runs, is a severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected personal security, coupled with a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the State the commands of the Constitution. Moreover, hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. See During the pat-down search, Trevizo discovered a gun and arrested Johnson.
This is particularly true in situations where the 'stop and frisk' of youths or minority group members is 'motivated by the officers' perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets. The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but, rather, whether there was justification for McFadden's invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation. He searched the third male, Katz, upon whom he found nothing. Stokes, I wonder if that could be broken down a little? If the officer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it turns out that the citizen is innocent. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship.
Surely—there was no seizure of the person? In concurrence with the second point, the third point addresses whether the exclusionary rule would go into effect, based upon the facts presented by the defense as to whether or not the seizure was lawful. At one point, while the two were standing together on the corner, a third man approached them and engaged them briefly in conversation. Rather, he says it is unreasonable for the policeman to take that step until such time as the situation evolves to a point where there is probable cause to make an arrest. We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, see, e. Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. Moreover, he does not say that an officer is always unjustified in searching a suspect to discover weapons. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States -- 1966, at 45-48, 152 and Table 51.
Chief Justice: The average police officer would do this under these circumstances. He had never seen the two men before, and he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to them. Also, although the Court puts the matter aside in the context of this case, I think an additional word is in order concerning the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop. But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct--necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat--which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. State of Ohio, 379 U. . Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives.
The term 'probable cause' rings a bell of certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as 'reasonable suspicion. But, in both our lower court and in our Appellate Court, in stating that a police officer should inquire promptly into suspicious on-the-street activity, we brought out the fact—and the record will show—that there was no interrogation, there was no investigation in this case as a result of the officer approaching him. Petitioner does not argue that a police officer should refrain from making any investigation of suspicious circumstances until such time as he has probable cause to make an arrest; nor does he deny that police officers, in properly discharging their investigative function, may find themselves confronting persons who might well be armed and dangerous. The Court holds, and I agree, that, while the right does not depend upon possession by the officer of a valid warrant, nor upon the existence of probable cause, such activities must be reasonable under the circumstances as the officer credibly relates them in court. The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for McFadden's invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find. Now, where they are in a position of great danger, are they in a position to protect themselves from violence, by looking into the situation to see if anyone is armed to do them violence? If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police.
The question is whether, in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure. Now under those circumstances, would you think that he did, or did not have a right to ascertain whether he was in a position of danger, by seeing if they had weapons? A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find. They appealed, arguing that evidence used to convict them had been discovered during an illegal search, but the was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court. On the motion to suppress the guns the prosecution took the position that they had been seized following a search incident to a lawful arrest. Justice Douglas argued that police searches should remain constrained by the standard of probable cause.